Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3

6 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : The Chinese Communist Military Threat to India

1. There are several reasons to be concerned over the possibility of a Chinese Communist attack on the Sino-Indian border. First, the weather becomes favorable for military operations and continues favorable until toward the end of the year in mid-September. Second, the Chicoms have forces in Tibet (around 120,000) capable of launching an attack on the scale of last fall with little or no warning, and, in fact, they have improved their logistical position by improving roads and establishing supply dumps. Finally, the Chicoms may have a political or psychological urge to demonstrate their militancy and their lack of fear of their enemies by giving the Indians another black eye right in front of both the Russians and the Americans. They may think a limited military foray would carry little risk of direct involvement with U.S. forces.

2. On the other hand, there is no solid evidence of concrete preparations for attack. Joe Alsop's articles reflect concern in New Delhi where memories of last fall's military debacle are still fresh. The Indians are supersensitive to any indication of Chinese military activity, and they have tended to exaggerate the evidence of the rather limited activity that we know about and to interpret it as a build-up for immediate attack. While we cannot be sure we would get any warning of intent to attack in this region on the relatively small scale of forces that would be involved, we are confident that such firm information as we have supports the capability to attack and does not support a clear intent to attack.

TS-174709
Copy 1 of 1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3

3. The Chinese have directed a number of harsh propaganda blasts at India since their withdrawal last fall, but the tone and volume have been much more restrained than immediately prior to the opening of hostilities last year. Both Foreign Minister Chen Yi and the authoritative People's Daily have recently reaffirmed China's intention to settle the border problem peacefully, although Peiping has warned New Delhi that it must bear the consequences for any rash actions in the future. In this connection, a Chinese Communist note to New Delhi of 1 September issued the last of a series of strong protests against Indian activities in border areas.

4. Obviously, the Chinese Communists can exercise their option of attacking again this fall if, in their view, the advantages outweigh the risks of provoking the Indians to establish a more effective Indian military posture on the border with the assistance of greater commitments of American and Russian support. On balance, our feeling is that Peiping will decide that for the time being the potential disadvantages outweigh the short-term gains of another border excursion right now.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3

UNCLASSIFIED when blank — TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document — Automatically downgraded to SECRET when filled in and detached from Top Secret Document

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY
SOURCE	The Chinese Communist Military Threat to India	CIA CONTROL NO. TS 174709
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DATE 6 Sep 63		LOGGED BY
COPY NO. 4		
NUMBER OF PAGES 2		
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS None		

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED *(OUTSIDE CIA)*	
TO		BY *(Signature)*		TO	
BY *(Signature)*		WITNESSED BY *(Signature)*		BY *(Signature)*	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040027-3